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USE OF COMPARABLES IN DETERMINING CONDEMNATION AWARDS
Community Redevelopment Agency v. Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d
341, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1967)
As early as 1956 the Community Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles
had begun to plan redevelopment of the Bunker Hill Area1 Area resi-
dents and property owners were notified of the pending redevelopment and
that the Agency would eventually purchase their property or take it by
eminent domain.2 After this notification there were no sales of area prop-
erty to anyone but the Agency.
In an earlier decision, the California Supreme Court sanctioned the
designation of the Bunker Hill Area as blighted and properly the subject
of redevelopment, and described the area as an "incompatible mixture" of
buildings of pre-1919 vintage, used primarily as rooming houses, with a
scattering of businesses.' The streets were portrayed as inadequate and the
topography as irregular. The majority of the properties, including defend-
ant's, was zoned for maximum height, high-rise residential use.' It is not
known whether defendant's property was improved, and ,if so, with what
type of building.' Despite the general deterioration of the Area, there were
1. The Community Redevelopmefit Agency's authority to acquire the property for the
elimination of blight and for redevelopment purposes was established in In re Bunker Hill
Urban Renewal Project IB, 61 Cal. 2d 21, 389 P.2d 538, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1964).
The area was bounded by the Harbor Freeway on the west, the newly built Civic Center
on the north, and a rapidly growing central business district to the south was to be
redeveloped.
2. Brief for Appellant (Defendant) at 27, Community Redevelopment Agency v.
Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 341, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CRA
v. Henderson]:
The undisputed facts were that in November 1956 a lis pendens was recorded
on all property within the Bunker Hill Area notifying all persons that this prop-
erty was in a redevelopment area and would eventually be purchased or taken by
eminent domain. Without the recordation of the ls pendens this fact was well
known by reason of the publicity about this project.
The veracity of this statement was not questioned by either the court or plaintiff's at-
torney.
3. In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project IB, 61 Cal. 2d 21, 33 n.2, 389 P.2d
538, 546 n.2, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, 82 n.2 (1964).
4. The properties were zoned R-5-4. "R-5" means high-rise residential and "4"
means the maximum height is unlimited.
5. Although at no point in the court's opinion on Henderson or in either of the at-
torney's briefs was the precise nature of the property indicated, two factors strongly indi-
cate that the subject property was improved with a dwelling unit of some type. First,
the defendant objected to plaintiff's submission of a property on which the building was to
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some significant developments nearby. Within two blocks of the defend-
ant's property were new high-rise office buildings, hotels, and the Los An-
geles Civic Center. The southerly boundary of the Area had been drawn
irregularly to exclude many new and prospering commercial structures.
These facts suggested that the adjacent business district was spreading to-
ward the Bunker Hill Area.
The Community Redevelopment Agency condemned defendant's prop-
erty. Since there had been no sales within the Area after 1957 other than
to the Agency, in valuing defendant's property, the trial court considered
expert testimony as to comparable sales6 outside the Area. The Agency's
expert witness, testifying to the sale price of residentially zoned properties
located outside the downtown area, arrived at a valuation of $72,500. De-
fendant, seeking a valuation of $227,000, introduced expert testimony on
the sales price of the nearest commercial properties, which were located in
the central business district. To support his submission, defendant attempted
to show that the urban renewal area was becoming commercial in charac-
ter due to its proximity to the Civic Center and the business district.'
The trial court accepted the Agency's arguments and exercised its dis-
cretion" to exclude all but one9 of the sales upon which defendant's experts
based their valuation. Although defendant's property was within two
blocks of commercial development, the judge did not find sufficient simi-
larity with respect to "character, situation, usability, and improvements"1
be demolished and used as a parking lot. This might indicate that he felt comparable
property must contain improvement of some kind. The second factor is linked to an ac-
cepted rule of evidence that when land is improved, such property cannot be offered in
evidence to establish the value of unimproved realty. E.g., Forest Preserve Dist. v.
Alton Ry., 391 Ill. 230, 62 N.E.2d 701 (1945). Obviously, if the subject property were
unimproved all of the attempted comparisons would be objectionable.
6. Comparable sales is a term used to describe the sale price of property "sufficiently
similar" to the condemned property to be of service as evidence of the market value
of the condemned property.
7. Brief for Appellant (Defendant), Brief for Appellee (Plaintiff), CRA v. Hender-
son, 251 Cal. App. 2d 341, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1967).
8. The trial judge's broad discretion is widely accepted. See Covina Union High
School Dist. v. Jobe, 174 Cal. App. 2d 340, 345 P.2d 78 (1959); 5 P. NIcHOLS,
EMINENT DOmmAN § 21.31 (3d ed. J. Sackman & R. Van Brunt 1962) [hereinafter
cited as NICHOLS].
9. The last sale introduced by defendant's expert was admitted. It was improved
with a small parking lot and was located immediately adjacent to, but outside of, the
Bunker Hill Area three blocks from the subject property. It appears that the admitted
property's location, size, and zoning were not substantially different from those of the
excluded comparisons. Plaintiff's attorney objected in the same manner to the intro-
duction of this property. Brief for Appellant (Defendant), Brief for Appellee (Plain-
tiff), CRA v. Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 341, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1967).
10. CRA v. Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 341, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1967).
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to warrant the admission of the sales prices of commercially zoned proper-
ties.' 1
In contrast, the Agency's expert witness was allowed to introduce resi-
dential sales prices on the basis that they were "sufficiently similar" to be
considered by the jury.2 Using these sales, the Agency's witness valued
defendant's property at $72,500 and the jury awarded that amount.
The Court of Appeals for the Second District of California reviewed the
trial judge's admission and exclusion of prices and the jury's valuation. In
Community Redevelopment Agency v. Henderson,3 it affirmed the award,
holding that the judge had not abused his discretion, and that the evidence
necessary for a proper determination had been presented to the jury.
Although Henderson involves one issue, it illustrates a much larger prob-
lem. The issue raised is whether evidence of allegedly comparable sales of
property introduced to establish the market value of defendant's property
was properly excluded. The broader question is whether adjustment can
be made in the comparables approach so that it reflects a fair application
of the market value technique when the subject property has been effec-
tively removed from the open market, and if not, what technique should
be used.
I. THE USE OF COMPARABLES TO ESTABLISH MARKET VALUE
Private property cannot be taken pursuant to the power of eminent do-
main without just compensation 4 which places the owner financially in
the same position as if condemnation had not occurred."' Courts almost
uniformly base just compensation on the market value of the condemned
11. One property was excluded solely because of a great disparity in size although
the court did say that there were other reasons. Prominent among the other reasons
was that the allegedly comparable properties were located on through-streets and were
surrounded by commercial buildings. The zoning differentiation was implicit in all of
the exclusions.
12. A few of defendant's objections to the admission of these properties were sus-
tained. Those found not comparable were improved with extremely old, deteriorated
dwelling units and were zoned differently than the subject property. Brief for Appellant
(Defendant), CRA v. Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 341, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1967).
13. 251 Cal. App. 2d 341, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1967).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V. " . . [NMor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." Whether the taking is for public use is not in issue
here, because public use was established in In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project
1B, 61 Cal. 2d 21, 389 P.2d 538, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1964).
15. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); United States v. Fort Smith
River Develop. Corp., 349 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Certain Prop-
erty, 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962); Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. DuPree Co.,
108 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1958); Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1950);
Monmouth Consol. Water Co. v. Blackburn, 72 N.J. Super. 377, 178 A.2d 377 (1962).
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property.' Market value is "an objective value which is measured by
studying comparable sales, income produced by the property, and recon-
struction costs."'" Most courts have held that the comparables method is
the most reliable approach in fixing value; it is the method most frequently
employed by professional appraisers. 8 There are two uses for comparables:
(1) as independent substantive evidence of value; and (2) to establish a
foundation for an expert's valuation based on his personal and professional
experience." California, along with the vast majority of jurisdictions, ad-
mits comparables for either purpose."0
It is within the discretion of the trial court to exclude certain evidence
regarding the sales price of other properties. To admit every sale each party
or expert thinks relevant would be time consuming, and the introduction
of obviously irrelevant prices might obscure the issue. Courts cannot, how-
ever, restrict consideration to sales of identical property because identical
properties, let alone identical conditions of sale, are often hard to find.
Therefore, courts must decide which properties are "sufficiently similar"
to the subject property to be admitted."
Although courts have established no fixed or general rule governing the
degree of similarity," they have developed some guidelines. Generally,
courts consider the following factors as they relate to both the subject prop-
erty and the property introduced as evidence: present use, relative size,
16. 5 NICHOLS § 21.1.
17. Sengstock & McAuliffe, What Is The Price of Eminent Domain?: An Introduc-
tion to the Problems of Valuation in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 44 J. URBAN LAW
185, 191 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Sengstock & McAuliffe]. Since neither the court
nor the attorneys in Henderson discussed the use of the rental value or reconstruction
costs techniques, they will not be considered in evaluating the court's decision.
18. Rollins, Selection of the Proper Appraisal Approach in Condemnation Suits,
SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN 47, 53-54 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Rollins].
19. United States v. Certain Interests in Property, 186 F. Supp. 167 (N.D. Cal.
1960), aff'd sub nom, Likins-Foster Monterey Corp. v. United States, 308 F.2d 595
(9th Cir. 1962).
20. County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957); 5
NICHOLS § 21.3(I); Sengstock & McAulliffe 194. A small minority of courts hold that
evidence of comparable sales is inadmissible on direct examination for the purpose of
establishing values. 5 NICHOLS § 21.3(1). But even these minority jurisdictions allow
the introduction of comparables on cross-examination to test the competence of an ap-
praiser. In re Civic Center in City of Detroit, 335 Mich. 528, 56 N.W.2d 375 (1953);
Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist. v. Fitzpatrick, 201 Minn. 442, 277 N.W. 392 (1937).
21. County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957); 5
NICHOLS § 21.31.
22. City of Chicago v. Vaccarro, 408 Ill. 587, 601, 97 N.E.2d 766, 773 (1951);
see Covina Union High School Dist. v. Jobe, 174 Cal. App. 2d 340, 352, 345 P.2d 78,
84 (1959) ; City of Evanston v. Piotrowicz, 20 Ill. 2d 512, 170 N.E.2d 569 (1960).
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nature of the improvements, geographical distance relation, proximity of
the sale to the date of valuation, voluntariness of the sale of the comparable
properties.23
In most jurisdictions the burden of proving similarity is on the party
introducing the allegedly comparable sales price.24 The trial judge has
discretion25 to decide whether sufficient similarity exists to warrant the ad-
mission of the price.26 The trial judge in Henderson did not abuse his dis-
cretion; since each admission and exclusion had legal precedent, his rulings
were not arbitrary or capricious.27 Thus, while the appellate court com-
mitted no reversible error in affirming the trial court, 28 there are reasons
for disagreeing with its result.
23. Although not using these exact terms there are several comprehensive articles
treating the use of these elements. See 5 NICHOLS § 23.31; Sengstock & McAuliffe
197-206; Note, Valuation Evidence in California Condemnation Cases, 12 STAN. L.
R v. 766 (1960).
24. State v. Boyd, 271 Ala. 584, 126 So. 2d 225 (1961); San Francisco v. Tillman
Estate Co., 205 Cal. 651, 272 P. 585 (1928); People v. Thomas, 108 Cal. App. 2d
832, 239 P.2d 914 (1952); see C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 166, at 348 (1954).
25. Los Angeles City High School Dist. v. Swensen, 226 Cal. App. 2d. 574, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 214 (1964); People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. City of Los Angeles, 220
Cal. App. 2d 345, 33 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1963); Lustine v. State Roads Comm'n, 217
Md. 274, 142 A.2d 566 (1958).
26. This decision is affected by the judge's basic conception of his role in the process
of determining the admissibility of evidence. If a judge conceives of his role as one
of sifting only the obviously irrelevant material, he is more likely to send border-line
comparisons to the jury and allow them to determine whether the similarity is suffi-
cient. But if the judge sees himself as the means for preventing disorderly, inefficient
and time consuming trials, he will necessarily apply the guidelines in such a manner
to exclude evidence which he feels is not sufficiently similar.
27. Each of the sales excluded had characteristics which could be said to distinguish
it significantly from defendant's property. In no case did the judge rely exclusively on
any single factor. He mentioned size differentiation, zoning dissimilarities, disparity in
improvements, a discrepancy between highest and best uses, and generally the distin-
guishable nature of the neighborhoods in which the properties were located. Prior cases
have applied these factors. See Sengstock & McAulliffe 196-210; Note, supra note 23,
at 782-88 (1960).
28. Undoubtedly the Court of Appeals in Henderson had the authority to review
the lower court's decision and reverse on substantive grounds. 5 NICHOLS § 23.31.
Therefore the appellate court's conception of its reviewing function may affect its de-
cision as to the correctness of a trial court's decision. Some appellate courts closely
scrutinize the trial judge's admission and exclusion of comparable properties. People
ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Guimarra Vineyards Corp., 245 Cal. App. 2d 342,
53 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1966); Commonwealth v. Hobson, 384 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1964).
Generally the reviewing court will look at the evidence merely to determine whether
there was a reasonable basis in the absence of error, abuse of discretion, or prejudicial
misconduct. Los Angeles City High School Dist. v. Swensen, 226 Cal. App. 2d 574,
38 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1964); City of Chicago v. Vaccarro, 408 Ill. 587, 97 N.E.2d 766
(1951); Forest Preserve Dist. v. Kercher, 394 Ill. 11, 66 N.E.2d 873 (1946). In the
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Whenever there is a reasonable basis for comparison, the trial judge
should not exclude the evidence of the sale. The evidence should be sub-
mitted to the jury, the degree of similarity or dissimilarity affecting the
weight of the testimony.29 Some courts have gone so far as to say that only
obviously irrelevant data should be excluded by the trial judge.3" But de-
spite judicial preference for a jury determination of valuation,31 the judge
in Henderson pre-empted the jury's determination by excluding all but
one of defendant's comparable sales, while admitting nearly all of plain-
tiff's comparables.
There are two possible grounds on which the trial judge based his de-
cision to exclude defendant's comparables: (1) all but one of defendant's
comparables were so dissimilar to the subject property so as to be inadmis-
sible; and (2) the comparables, being commercial in nature, were not rele-
vant. The admission of the single commercial property is inconsistent with
either ground.
Defendant's final submission, which was the only one admitted, was a
parking lot located three blocks from defendant's property. It was no more
similar to the subject property than any of the properties excluded. It was
of a different size, zoned differently, and, as was the case with all of the
excluded properties, was located within the adjacent central business dis-
trict. 2 Therefore, the judicial guidelines appear to provide no basis for the
decision to admit the one and exclude the others. The only reason for the
inclusion appears to be that it was the last property introduced by defend-
ant; perhaps the court had to include this sale or face reversal on the
ground that it completely pre-empted the jury by excluding all of defend-
ant's submissions.
latter case if the grounds are at all reasonable, the reviewing court may, if it desires,
affirm without seriously considering the effect of the judge's action on the particular
property involved.
The discretion of the trial judge may also be used to admit as well as exclude com-
parable properties. Whether the issue on appeal is exclusion or admission may determine
the appellate court's viewpoint. The appellate court may be more willing to overrule
a trial judge's admission of questionable comparisons if it fears the introduction of col-
lateral issues and the resulting waste of time. On the other hand a reviewing court may
disapprove the exclusion of evidence if it feels that the jury can render a fair decision
only if it has before it a number of comparables to weigh and evaluate.
29. City of Chicago v. Vaccarro, 408 Ill. 587, 97 N.E.2d 766 (1951); Lustin v.
State Roads Comm'n, 217 Md. 274, 142 A.2d 566 (1958); Rollins 47.
30. City of Chicago v. Vaccarro, 408 Ill. 587, 97 N.E.2d 766 (1951); Hays v. State,
342 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
31. People ex eI. Dept. of Public Works v. Donovan, 57 Cal. 2d 346, 369 P.2d 1,
19 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1962).
32. Brief for Appellant (Defendant), CRA v. Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 341, 59
Cal. Rptr. 311 (1967).
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And, of course, the admission of one commercially zoned comparable
precludes the argument that the other of defendant's offerings were inad-
missible because zoned differently than the subject property. By admitting
one commercial property the judge impliedly conceded the possibility that
commercially zoned property might be properly admitted. The jury was
to determine whether, had no public action occured, there was a reasonable
probability that the zoning would have changed. It is thus plausible that
the judge admitted a commercial property to provide the jury with a basis
for a commercial valuation if it decided the zoning would change. The
force of that admission, however, was effectively undermined by allowing
only one of the defendant's properties for comparison while admitting nu-
merous comparisons from which the jury could choose if it concluded that
residential zoning was the appropriate assumption. In effect, therefore, the
court forced the jury toward the position that residential zoning was the
correct comparison.
In making its rulings, the court placed a great deal of emphasis on the
fact that defendant's property was zoned differently than his comparison
properties. While some courts exclude sales on the basis of zoning differen-
tiation,33 most courts hold that such dissimilarity does not render the evi-
dence incompetent.34 Zoning differences may be totally without significance
if there is a reasonable probability that the property will be rezoned."s Since
the potential use of the property depends upon its zoning classification, and
a comparison of uses is relevant to value, the trial judge should have per-
mitted the jury to first determine the probability that defendant's property
would have been rezoned commercial, and then ascertain the relevancy of
the defendant's sales.38
By admitting one commercially zoned comparable, and rejecting the
others, the court in Henderson raised the general problem of using com-
parables in urban renewal area property valuations. The strict limitations
of the court-developed standards of comparability are likely to result in the
exclusion from comparison of the only reasonably comparable properties
available.
33. People v. Dunn, 46 Cal. 2d 639, 297 P.2d 964 (1956); 1 L. OROEL, VALUATION
UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOM AIN § 164 (2d ed. 1953).
34. City of Evanston v. Piotrowicz, 20 Ill. 2d 512, 526, 170 N.E.2d 569, 576 (1960).
35. Limerick, The Effect of Zoning On Valuation In Eminent Doman, 53 ILL,
B.J. 956, 959 (1965).
36. Rollins 47-48, 54.
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IL Is THE COMPARABLES METHOD VALID IN URBAN RENEWAL AREAS?
Although the market value standard was originally merely a tool in
determining just compensation,"7 the courts have come to regard it as con-
clusive. 8 Some courts have gone so far as to hold clearly incompetent an
expert's testimony based upon some concept other than fair market value,
such as value for a single use or value to the owner." Underlying the
difficulties raised by Henderson is the California courts' assumption that
just compensation and market value are interchangeable terms."
The market value method employed by the Henderson court is based on
the assumption that the prices of the comparison properties, as well as de-
fendant's property, were subject to a free and active market which created
a market value at the time of the taking.4 The prices of these other
properties were accepted as indicative of the market value. However, a
clear distinction must be made between market value and market price.4
Market price is the actual amount at which properties are being sold. Sales
of comparable properties are indicators of the market price of the con-
demned property. On the other hand, market value is the amount of
37. United States v. Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962); Jacksonville
Expressway Auth. v. DuPree Co., 108 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1958). See generally Man-
delker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966
Wis. L. Rv. 3; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HLv. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
38. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943). This reliance upon what origi-
nally was a tool in the determination of just compensation has produced the virtual
equation of just compensation and market value. Unted States v. 190.70 Acres of Land,
300 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1962). This merging is reflected in the similarity of the defi-
nition of the two terms.
California courts define fair market value as the highest price which the property
would bring if exposed for sale in the open market with reasonable time allowed to
find a purchaser, buying with knowledge of all the uses and purposes to which the
property is adapted. Sacramento So. R.R. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 104 P. 979
(1909), accord, Note, supra note 23.
Just compensation has been defined as "what a willing buyer would pay a willing
seller at the time of the taking, considering the highest and best use of the property."
United States v. Certain Land in Borough of Brooklyn, 346 F.2d 690, 693 (2d Cir.
1965). Other courts use the terms interchangeably. See, e.g., Board of Trustees
v. B.J. Service Inc., 75 N.M. 459, 406 P.2d 171 (1965).
39. Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Cal. App. 512, 9 P.2d 335 (1932); 1 L.
OROEL, supra note 33, § 132.
40. People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. City of Los Angeles, 220 Cal. App. 2d
345, 33 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1963).
41. The California rule admitting comparables is based on the assumption that the
market elements are the same for the subject property and the comparable property
at the time of the condemnation. County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 312
P.2d 680 (1957).
42. Rollins 47, 52.
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money which a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller, taking into
consideration all the uses for which the land was adapted and might reason-
ably be applied.43 Therefore, market price may be equated to market value
only under free, active and ideal market conditions.
The broad issue raised by Henderson is whether adjustment can be made
in the comparables approach so that it more accurately reflects the market
value of property taken by eminent domain. The Community Redevelop-
ment Agency, by its activities since 1957," had removed all Bunker Hill
property from the open market, thereby eliminating the best source of
comparables. And even if there had been sales in the area, they would have
reflected the effect on values of urban renewal and hence have had little
or no relevance in predicting what would have been at the time of taking
and absent urban renewal the fair value of defendant's property.
In the absence of recent sales in the immediate area, the courts must
look to comparable properties in other areas. Before admitting these other
properties, the judge should determine what the character and use of the
defendant's property would be if the public agency had not acted, i.e., but
for the designation of the Bunker Hill Area as a renewal site, what develop-
ment of defendant's property could reasonably have been foreseen. Under
existing precedent,45 looking outside of the immediate area for comparables
is difficult, if not impossible. Henderson illustrates these difficulties.
Perhaps the greatest problem in placing a value on condemned property
is the difficulty in finding property sufficiently similar for purposes of com-
parison. The closer the properties are to areas affected by public activity,
the greater the likelihood that the activity will distort the market, thereby
negating the validity of a comparison. The more distant the location of
the properties from the subject property, the less likely that courts will find
sufficient geographical proximity.46
The ease with which comparable properties may be found is a function
of numerous variables. The critical ones are the size of the city, the size of
the renewal area in relation to the size of the city, the location of the re-
newal area in relation to the heart of the city, and the use of the subject
property. If a city is large, the renewal area small and located away from
the downtown area, and the property used as a residence, the likelihood of
finding comparable properties is high. If a city is small, on the other hand,
with a large renewal area which encompasses the central business district
of the city, it is virtually impossible to find property sufficiently similar to be
43. 4 NICHOLS § 12.2.
44. Sengstock & McAulliffe 196.
45. 5 NicHOLS § 23.31.
46. Sengstock & McAulliffe 196.
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considered comparable. The situation in Henderson, it appears, lies some-
where between these two extremes. Los Angles is large, but so too is the
renewal area which is located in an area of development critical to the
city's growth.
In light of the obvious difficulties with the comparables technique, two
adjustments are suggested: (1) the relaxation of the standards for deter-
mining sufficient similarity in order to make them more sensitive to the
scarcity of appropriate comparables; and (2) the relaxation of the prox-
imity rule so as to permit venturing as far as necessary to find similar prop-
erty. Despite the inadequacies of the comparables approach, if these two
adjustments are made it may be the best technique presently available.
In those situations in which it is found impossible to find comparable
sales, alternative methods of valuation must necessarily be used. Since the
capitalization of rents and reproduction cost techniques assume that the
subject property is in an active market, they are likewise inappropriate.47
When faced with a non-existent or unascertainable market value, some
courts have used the loss to the owner as the standard of just compensa-
tion."' If indemnification is what the framers of the Constitution had in
mind in requiring compensation, it follows that loss to the owner is the
standard that should be used in determining value in condemnation."
The loss test has been used infrequently because courts have admitted
their inability to find a market value in only a few special situations." The
only properties considered to have no market are churches and historical
structures. Even in such cases, courts have held that market value represents
the maximum which the owner may recover.5 The holdings of these
cases have not been extended. They dealt with a viable real estate market
in the community; the problems arise from a lack of willing buyers or
sellers for the particular property involved due to the uniqueness of the
47. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1942); United States v. 287.89 Acres
of Land, 241 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Pa. 1965); In re City of New York, 197 Misc. 70,
89 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1949); L.G.N. Turnpike Co. v. Creveling, 159 Tenn. 147,
17 S.W.2d 22 (1929).
48. Sengstock & McAuliffe 190.
49. 4 NICHOLS § 12.22(2); see People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. City
of Los Angeles, 220 Cal. App. 2d 345, 33 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1963); Anderson, Conse-
quence of Anticipated Eminent Domain Proceedings-Is Loss of Value a Factor?, 5
SANTA CLARA LAW. 35 (1964); Sengstock & McAuliffe 190.
50. United States v. 190.71 Acres of Land, 300 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1962); Glaves,
Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain: Irreverence For Unconstitutional Practice,
30 U. Cm. L. Rav. 319, 324 (1963).
5I. Glaves, supra note 50; Note, Challenging the Condemnor's Right to Condemn:
Avoidance of Peripheral Damages, 1967 WAsH. U.L.Q. 436, 439.
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building. Though the situation in the Henderson case is different, the
doctrine could be profitably employed. Here the building is not unique;
it is a type normally bought and sold. However, in both cases market value
is undeterminable because of the absence of willing buyers and sellers.
If abandoning the market value standard is too radical a proposal, ad-
justments may be made in the application of that standard which would
insure more equitable treatment for property owners. One possible adjust-
ment is to roll back the date of taking to the time when the area was
designated as blighted." The property is then valued at the date of the
first public act affecting value. Neither loss nor gain attributable to public
action is passed on to the land owner. Furthermore, the problem of finding
comparables is removed, because sales in or near the urban renewal area
just prior to announcement will not have been distorted by public action.
The problem with this method is that it does not give the owner credit for
appreciation in value that might have occurred (due to inflation, for
example) between designation and taking. The time span is often long
enough to make the loss (or gain) significant.
Another adjustment is to enlarge the market considered relevant for
comparison purposes. A flexible application of the "sufficiently similar"
standard will allow a wider search for comparable sales, not limiting it to
properties in the same area or of the approximate value of the condemned
property. As a basis for extrapolation, sales might be introduced to indicate
value prior to the designation of the area as a possible urban renewal site.
Either adjustment is in accord with the spirit of the Miller rule: "an emi-
nent domain award is to be adjusted so that it reflects neither an enhance-
ment nor a depreciation in value attributable to the improvement for which
the property was taken. 513
Henderson illustrates the difficulties of applying the market test in a con-
text in which public activities have seriously impeded the function of the
market. Henderson compounds the problem by limiting the extent to which
comparables can be utilized by the condemnee. Either a more sensitive use
of the comparables approach or an alternative to it is called for in such
cases.
52. Note, supra note 51, at 436-43. This Note makes it clear that, even if the
"time of taking" is the time of designation, the actual viewing and valuation does not
occur until the trial, many months or years later.
53. D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 546 (1966). This is
a clear statement of the rule established in United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
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